Th e Islamic Financial Industry is an industry that organises fi nancial services in accordance with Islamic Law, in the same way as the traditional fi nancial industry is organised in accordance with secular law. Th e unique challenges facing the industry in terms of compliance with Islamic law have been internationally recognised in relation to capital adequacy, risk management, corporate governance, transparency and disclosure. Th e same, however, has not been true in the area of dispute resolution. Th e purpose of this paper is to identify the unique challenges facing Islamic fi nance in compliance with Islamic law in the ambit of English courts, evaluate the features of international commercial arbitration as they relate to overcoming these challenges, and provide some suggestions for going forward. Th e paper is structured as follows: Section 1 will be used to introduce Islamic fi nance and frame the issues facing the industry in relation to dispute resolution. Section 2 will focus on providing the background required, while Section 3 frames Islamic fi nance in relation to conventional fi nance. Section 4 will provide an insight into Islamic law.
Introduction
Th is section will fi rst introduce the topic of Islamic fi nance and the problems that may come to face the industry in terms of dispute resolution.
Th e potential issues facing the industry, in regard to the resolution of disputes, will be framed within the context of two decisions: one made in the ambit of the English courts and the other through arbitration.
In today's increasingly competitive business environment, to thrive, or even to survive, requires not only the intricate alignment of a complex array of information, operations, and logistics, but also requires ready access to cost eff ective fi nancing.
1 Providing the required fi nancing is the objective of fi nancial intermediation. 2 Often, there exists more than one way by which to reach an objective and nowhere is this more true than in the area of fi nancial intermediation, where two alternate structural paths, designed to reach the same objective, now stand side by side 3 -conventional fi nance and Islamic fi nance. Although Islamic modes of fi nancing have been in practice in one form or another since the early history of Islam, 4 as an industry, Islamic fi nance has been essentially dormant from the late nineteenth century through the recent past. Not until the later part of the twentieth century did the Islamic fi nancial 1 In support of effi cient business operations, all business must secure fi nancing to support needs for working capital (inventories, salaries), assets (i.e. property, equipment, research) and sales (consumer credit). See Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion Risk, and Return, Th e Hague, (Kluwer International Law) 1998. 2 'At the core of any fi nancial industry is structuring a process by which those who have money and those who need money fi nd each other and organize their relationship.' Mohamed El-Gari, presentation at the conference; Islamic Finance: Relevance and Growth in the Modern Financial Age, London School of Economics, 1 Feb 2007. 3 With the exception of Iran and Sudan where banking is legislated to be 100% Islamic, in the countries where Islamic fi nancial products are made available, they are usually provided in conjunction with conventional fi nance. 4 Th roughout the Middle Ages, Islamic merchants became indispensable middlemen for fostering trade through development of sophisticated credit instruments in Spain, the Mediterranean and Baltic states. See Zuhair Iqbal and Hiroshi Tsubota, "Emerging Islamic Capital Markets: A Quickening Pace and a New Potential" in Th e Euromoney International Debt Capital Handbook, (Euromoney Yearbooks) 2006, pp. 134-140. In addition, Islamic modes of fi nancing were also seen to be the method of choice in funding trade in the Ottoman Empire: 'Even though there did not exist an insurmountable barrier against the use of interest-bearing loans for commercial credit, this alternative was not pursued in the medieval Islamic world. Instead, numerous other commercial techniques were developed which played the same role as interest-bearing loans and thus made the use of loans unnecessary.' See Sevket Pamuk, 'Th e Evolution of Factor Markets in the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800', presented at the Global Economic History Network Workshop on Th e Rise, Organization and Institutional Framework of Factor Markets, 2005. industry experience a resurgence-a resurgence, which although initially slow, 5 picked up to a dramatic pace in the early part of the twenty-fi rst century. 6 Th e resurgence and exponential growth experienced in Islamic fi nance in the past few years is of particular note as it not only serves to increase the breadth of fi nancial product off erings 7 on the international scene, it is also making-intentionally or unintentionally-a decidedly positive contribution in bridging the current chasm between the West and Islam; a chasm that was until recently thought by some to be insurmountable. 8 Hence, the need to ensure continued stability and growth of this industry is no longer a concern unique to those who may have been the catalyst for its resurgence, 9 but rather should be a concern that is shared by all players. 10 A precondition to sustainable development of any fi nancial industry is a suitable regulatory framework, which includes an eff ective dispute resolution mechanism. 9 Th e resurgence of Islam fi nance was primarily driven by Muslims that viewed the fl ight into Islamic banking as a direct means by which society could revive an abandoned commercial tradition. As noted by Professor Mallat, the advocacy was seen to run along the following lines: 'let's go back to the tradition in is pure form, get rid of interest, and establish a riba-free Islamic banking system'; see Chibli Mallat, ' Islamic fi nance, which, as the name implies, is fi nancial intermediation accomplished in a manner that is fi rmly rooted in the Islamic principles articulated in the Shariʿah, 12 and, as such, requires that:
Practitioners create products that simultaneously satisfy the demands of secular and religious laws, in much the same way as they must look to the laws of two or more jurisdictions in structuring a cross-border transaction.
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Up-front compliance with Islamic law is verifi ed by Shariʿah boards, 14 and is required as a condition precedent to contract. But, as demonstrated in the following cases, it appears that the role of Islamic law, which is arguably the law, or one of the laws, with the closest connection to Islamic fi nance contracts, may, depending on the selected forum, be diminished during the dispute resolution process.
Case: Two contracts concerning Islamic fi nancial transactions, similar governing law clauses, but diff ering fora. Th e fi rst providing for arbitration, while the second providing for English courts. Disputes ensued. Juxtaposing the outcomes of the resolution of these two disputes may serve to highlight the fl exibility of arbitration in addressing disputes arising under Islamic fi nance agreements, while serving to highlight the limitations in the ability of the English courts to apply Islamic law.
In the fi rst case, which pertained to an Estisna 15 fi nancing arrangement between International Investor KCSC (Kuwait) and Sanghi Polyester Ltd. (SPL), 16 arbitration was the dispute resolution mechanism of choice, and 12 Th e Shariʿah, which literally means "the path", and its role in Islam and Islamic law is further discussed in Section 4, infra.
13 Th omas C. Baxter, Jr., Executive Vice President and General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Statement before the Seminar on Legal Issues in the Islamic Financial Services Industry, Kuwait City, 2 March 2005.
14 Islamic fi nancial institutions employ a committee of Islamic jurists that study the proposed fi nancial transaction, and issue an opinion as to the compliance of the transaction to Islamic law in the form of a fatwā, which is a non-binding jurist's opinion. 15 Refers to a contract whereby a manufacturer (contractor) agrees to produce (build) and deliver a well-described good (or premise) at a given price on a given date in the future. Th e price need not be paid in advance. It may be paid in installments in step with the preferences of the parties or partly at the front end and the balance later on as agreed. See, supra, note 5, vii. the terms of reference of the arbitration confi rmed the place of arbitration as London and the "applicable substantive law" as:
Th is dispute shall be governed by the Laws of England except to the extent it may confl ict with Islamic Shariʿah, which shall prevail 17 Th e decision of the arbitrator, an expert in Islamic law, as expressed in an ICC Arbitration Award obtained in London, gave eff ect to the parties' will to be governed by English law, except where this would confl ict with Shariʿah, by awarding principal and the profi t claims, but disallowing additional damages claims because, although compliant with English law, these would confl ict with Islamic Shariʿah.
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In the second case, a Morabaha 19 fi nancing agreement between a Bahraini bank and a Bangladeshi pharmaceutical group, 20 the decision of the English court, in interpreting the governing law clause:
Subject to the principles of Glorious Shariʿah this agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England 21 found the proviso "Subject to the principles of the Glorious Shariʿah" to be inadequate to fulfi l the purpose of incorporating the principles of Shariʿah law into the parties' agreements, deeming that the governing law of the contract is simply English law and held accordingly. Although this holding failed to ensure compliance with the mandatory principles of Shariʿah as was the apparent intention of the parties, it was upheld by the English court of appeal 22 and welcomed by some in the legal profession as adding certainty.
23 17 Ibid., at 750. 18 Ibid., at 749. 19 Sale at a specifi ed profi t margin contract. Th e term, however, is now used to refer to a sale agreement whereby the seller purchases the goods desired by the buyer and sells them at an agreed marked-up price, the payment being settled within an agreed time frame, either in installments or in a lump sum. Th e seller bears the risk for the goods until they have been delivered to the buyer. See, supra, note 5, vii. 20 One fi nds that the decision made within the ambit of the English courts, the well established forum of choice in international fi nancial transactions, 24 both for legal certainty 25 and speed, 26 by trading off "certainty of Shariʿah compliance" for "fi nancial commercial certainty", served to, render the use of the term "Islamic" in Islamic fi nance as a mere attempt to draw a distinction, without there being a real diff erence between Islamic and conventional fi nancing. On the other hand, one fi nds that the arbitral decision gave meaning to the term "Islamic" in Islamic fi nance by ensuring compliance with Shariʿah.
Was this English court holding 27 case unique, or do the heteronomous restrictions on the parties' autonomy within the ambit of English courts expose the parties to the risk of violating the mandatory provisions of Shariʿah, which form the fundamental pillars on which Islamic fi nance transactions are built? If so, then, to what extent?
Was the arbitral decision unique, or do the inherent features of arbitration provide for more fl exibility in terms of rendering decisions that are in line with the expectations, intentions, and will of the parties than do national courts when it comes to the application of Islamic law as an applicable law of contract? If so, can international commercial arbitration play a positive role in overcoming the limitations posed by English courts in the resolution of disputes relating to Islamic fi nancial transactions? More specifi cally, do the features of international commercial arbitration readily lend themselves to giving meaning to the term "Islamic" in Islamic fi nance by ensuring compliance with the mandatory provisions of Shariʿah, a nonnational law, in the dispute resolution phase? 24 H.L.E. Verhagen, 'Th e Tension between Party Autonomy and European Union Law: Some Observations on Ingmar Gb Ltd V Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc.', ICLQ, 51/1 (2002) 135. In addition, discussion with legal representatives involved in the Islamic fi nancial industry support the conclusion that adoption of a dispute resolution clause that includes English Courts as the forum and English law as the governing law continues to be a not unusual approach in Islamic fi nancial transactions. 25 In banking and fi nancial transactions in particular legal certainty is a paramount consideration and the certainty that this choice brings is highly prized by the contractual counterparties and English lawyers alike. Foreign parties often agree to the application of English law applied by the English courts on their understanding that when they select English law what they provide for in the contract is usually all that they get See Stuart Dutson, ' Th e purpose of this paper is to attempt to answer these questions 28 by examining both, the limitations that may be posed on the English courts that prevent giving eff ect to Islamic law as a governing law of contract within the dispute resolution process and the advantages that could fl ow from selection of arbitration as the dispute resolution forum in the sphere of Islamic fi nance.
Before commencing this examination, not only must background suffi cient to allow for an understanding of Islamic fi nancial intermediation and its commercial purpose be provided, but also the nature of Islamic law and its implications must be addressed. As such, Sections 2-4 are reserved for this purpose.
Background
In this section, suffi cient background is presented as to allow for the contextual understanding of the Islamic fi nancial industry, both in terms of its history and its unique legal requirements.
Notwithstanding that the number of years which represent the history of Islamic fi nance are large in magnitude, 29 a state of dormancy for the majority of the twentieth century 30 has cast Islamic fi nance in the role of a "developing industry" in the current sphere of global fi nance. As Dr. ElAhdab noted, 31 the development of law often follows the development of a 28 Although solutions within the context of the English courts, or alternate national forum, may also be possible to address the current potential violation of mandatory provision of Shariʿah through the selection of English courts as the forum of choice in Islamic fi nance contracts, I leave the identifi cation and evaluation of those solutions to those more learned than I. Th e intent of this current work is only to address the possibility of the forum of international commercial arbitration as a viable solution. 29 new industry as to provide the supporting legal framework designed to address the new concerns that arise from the operation of the new industry:
It has become usual to note the evolution of law over the years and also the development of existing rights or the appearance of new regulations, which refl ect the new needs for the national and international society. For example, during the 17th and 18th centuries, maritime law developed as a result of the development of this kind of commerce. Similarly, during the 19th century the doctrine of objective liability appeared following the industrial revolution and the appearance of machines and, fi nally, the 20th century has seen the appearance of a new kind of law, Air Transport Law, because of the arrival of this new form of transportation and the problems which result therefrom.
To date, a global Islamic fi nance law, although likely to be available in the future, has not yet been developed. 32 To sustain the exponential growth experienced in the area of Islamic fi nance, both in terms of volume 33 and diversity, 34 requires, as noted by Dr. Akhtar, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia in 2004, during the 3rd Annual Islamic Finance Summit, that the legal infrastructure, including the area of dispute resolution, be customised to accommodate the unique features of Islamic fi nance:
. . . precondition to sustain the continued growth of Islamic banking and fi nance is a comprehensive legal infrastructure for legal redress arising from Islamic fi nancial transactions. Th e legal infrastructure needs to comprise both eff ective regulatory and substantive laws as well as appropriate adjudicative fora for parties to resolve disputes relating to Islamic fi nancial transactions. To address this, eff orts are needed to develop a suffi cient number of competent lawyers and judges that are equipped with sound knowledge and expertise in both Shari'ah and civil laws to deal with such matters. Despite much progress, 36 which may have been broader in countries with strong Islamic tradition, 37 an approach of "customisation to meet the needs of the Islamic fi nance industry" has not been taken in secular courts. Th is may be due to a lack of fl exibility by secular courts in the in accommodation of religious law.
Th is lack of fl exibility in the accommodation of religious law appears to have underpinned the English court's failure to give eff ect to the mandatory principles of Shariʿah, the foundational pillars on which Islamic fi nance is built, in their decision relating to the Beximco case.
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Vogel and Hayes noted, as early as 1998, the pivotal nature of applying a governing law other than Islamic law in Islamic fi nance contracts: 39 . . . Islamic law does not allow recovery of lost profi ts, seeing such claims as both speculative and unearned. But a national law may award such damages, even against a losing party's protest that the contract is 'Islamic'. Note also that if the parties have agreed on terms that are questionable under Islamic law but allowed under local law . . . the local legal system will almost certainly enforce it . . . enabling parties to . . . evade Islamic law.
It is against this background that one may begin to understand why the limitations, currently imposed by the selection of English courts as the dispute resolution forum for contracts designed to be simultaneously 36 Although secular countries have also undertaken some legislative reforms, these have been primarily in the tax arena. For example the UK has, since 2003, undertaken legislation to ensure non-biased tax treatment of Islamic fi nance products. Currently there exists legislation enabling the use of Islamic fi nancing methods for an individual or business to fi nance a property purchase, bank deposits and borrow money from a fi nancial institution. Similar regulatory changes are now under consideration for the issue of 'sukuk' (the Islamic fi nance equivalent of a bond). 38 Supra, note 22. 39 Supra, note 1.
compliant with both secular and religious laws, may compel some participants in Islamic fi nance to search for a forum-such as arbitration-that may prove more conducive to furthering, rather than defeating, the commercial purpose of Islamic fi nance. To evaluate whether arbitration possesses the inherent features that would render it more conducive to accommodating the dispute resolution needs of Islamic fi nancial transactions, an adequate understanding of the commercial purpose of the Islamic fi nance must fi rst be developed.
Attempting to develop an adequate understanding of the commercial purpose of Islamic fi nance, without looking through the appropriate prism that allows one to develop such an understanding within the proper context, would be, in essence, trying to gain an understanding of a subject matter in a vacuum. As such, in an eff ort to construct the prism that will be eff ective in elucidating the "commercial purpose" and salient aspects of Islamic fi nance, we borrow from Lord Wilberforce's dictum in Reardon Smith, 40 and extrapolate to an industry level:
In a commercial contract it is certainly right that the court should know the commercial purpose of the contract and this in turn presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context, the market in which the parties are operating. 41 [emphasis added]
Hence, equipped with background, before turning to evaluating arbitration as an eff ective dispute resolution alternative, suffi cient foundation, as to allow for an understanding of the Islamic fi nance as an industry, in the context of its origins, must fi rst be provided. Th e following two sections provide this foundational framework. Section 3 will cover Islamic fi nance within the context of fi nancial intermediation and Section 4 will be reserved for a discussion on Islam and Islamic law, its schools and spectrum of interpretations, prohibitions and possibilities.
Islamic Finance and Financial Intermediation
Th e purpose of this section is to begin to provide the foundational framework required by presenting a view of Islamic fi nance within the context of global fi nancial intermediation. It is also the intent of this section to highlight the main diff erences that distinguish Islamic fi nance from conventional fi nance. As previously noted, 42 the principal role of a fi nancial industry is to provide fi nancial intermediation by structuring a process by which those who have money and those who need money fi nd each other and organise their relationship of exchange for the benefi t of all parties.
In any fi nancial transaction, there must be at least two parties; the owner/supplier of the funds, the "Depositor", and the party in need of funds to make an investment, the "Borrower". Typically, in any transaction, there is also a third entity that makes the transaction between the two parties possible, the "Intermediary". Th e main role of the intermediary in the fi nancial industry is providing savers with a means by which to eff ectively use their surplus funds-their "Deposits", and to provide the investor ready access to these pooled deposits. Success of the fi nancial transaction is measured from the depositor's point of view in terms of liquidity and return, and from the borrower's point of view in terms of availability and cost of funds. Hence, optimisation of the intermediary's returns rests squarely on eff ectively pooling the resources of the depositors, and effi ciently utilising these resources to generate positive returns by making these funds available to the borrowers.
In two-party transactions, namely those transaction precluding the intermediary, the options are limited. Th e saver can either lend the funds to the borrower or can share in the investment through some sort of partnership mechanism.
Th e role of the fi nancial intermediary is to increase the number of options available to both primary parties, the depositors and the borrowers, by increasing the range of viable fi nancial instruments available to accomplish their saving and borrowing needs. Th e role of intermediary is performed through both banking and non-banking institutions.
Although the requirement for fi nancing is a universal one, shared by people of all walks of life and all faiths, the means by which they accomplish fi nancial intermediation is what varies. Two such systems that are designed to provide fi nancial intermediation are conventional fi nance and Islamic fi nance.
In conventional fi nance, the basic building block in fi nancial intermediation is an interest-based transaction, in which the saver is guaranteed a rate of return for the use of their funds, and in which borrower receives access to the funds in the form of debt, to be repaid on a date certain, in the form of principle plus interest. Th e transactions in this process are both discrete, and at arm's length, with the only risk assumed by the depositor is for the insolvency of the intermediary, or the borrower 43 -the debt must be paid back regardless of the success or failure of the ultimate investment, and is often guaranteed by third parties.
Th is interest-based approach to fi nancial intermediation is rendered invalid by the doctrinal teachings of Islam. Two prohibitions in the doctrinal teachings of Islam, namely the prohibitions of riba 44 and gharar 45 essentially render any interest-based transaction invalid. Hence, Islamic fi nance is designed to provide Muslims a means by which they can meet their present-day fi nancing needs, within the context of their religious values. Islam adopts the view that, unlike the approach that maintains a separation between Church and State, 46 the material and the spiritual are inextricably linked, and both are guided by the Shariʿah, which literally means "the path".
Th is in no way implies that Islamic fi nance, like its conventional counterpart, is not driven by market forces in an eff ort to attain effi ciency and optimise returns. 47 Indeed, it is, but simply stated, it just must do so within the bounds of those overarching constraints imposed by the mandatory 43 In the case that there is no intermediary, then the insolvency of the investor may put the saver at risk. 44 For a discussion on the riba, see infra, Section 4.1.1. 45 For a discussion on gharar, see infra, Section 4. principles of Islamic law relating to commercial transactions. 48 Th us, these constraints, simply serve to limit the means by which Islamic fi nance accomplishes fi nancial intermediation to gaining returns from investment activities and other operations that generate extra wealth, such as assetbacked trade.
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Islamic fi nancial intermediation is viewed as a partnership in which all participants risk and share in both the profi ts and the losses, requires ensuring that compliance with Shariʿah is maintained throughout the lifecycle of the Islamic fi nance-not only in the collection and pooling of available funds, but also through investment and distribution of returns. Th is view represents a paradigm shift from conventional fi nance; in which it is the returns, rather than the means by which the returns are obtained, that are sought to be secured. Hence, although the objectives of both systems are ostensibly the same, conventional and Islamic fi nance diff er in one major way, in that the former guarantees depositors certain return, while the later guarantees the process, rather than the return.
Consequently, not only must each individual fi nancial transaction in Islamic fi nance simultaneously satisfy the demands of secular and Islamic law, but this duality must also be respected by all transactions involved in the entire Islamic fi nancial intermediation process lifecycle. Simply stated, the mosaic of contracts used to accomplish Islamic fi nancial intermediation must be viewed as a chain, in which Shariʿah compliance must be maintained for all transactions within the fi nancial intermediation process lifecycle in order for the ultimate returns to be compliant; meaning that if one transaction within the chain is tainted with riba or gharar, that would render the entire process non-Islamic and would require that the returns are cleansed 50 or purifi ed from income earned from non-permissible activities. 48 In addition to riba and ghara, trade must not include trade in assets by which are prohibited by the Shariʿah, such as alcohol or pork products. For further elaboration on the prohibitions, see infra, Section 4. 49 Supra, note 1, 198. 50 Cleansing is mechanism to purify investments that are tainted by prohibited activities. Th e cleansing process is normally performed by the individual investors, although, in some cases, the Islamic funds would perform the task on behalf of their investors. For instance, if some part of the income from interest-bearing accounts (prohibited by Shariʿah) is included in the income of the company, the proportion of such income in the dividend paid to the shareholder must be given to charity, and must not be retained by the shareholder. See Islamic Capital Market Fact Finding Report, Islamic Capital Market Task Notwithstanding this intricate complexity, the search for simplicity has led some, in light of the obvious prohibitions, to simply use the term "interest-free" 51 in conjunction with Islamic fi nance. But, as Zamir Iqbal of the World Bank, clearly points out:
Describing the Islamic fi nancial system simply as "interest-free" does not do justice to the system. Promotion of entrepreneurship, preservation of property rights, transparency and the sanctity of contractual obligations, which are crucial to any sound fi nancial system describe the essence.
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Understanding Islamic fi nance within this context-a current-day fi nancial industry that is inextricably linked to the principles of Islam-fi rst requires an understanding of Islam.
Islam-the Religion and the Law
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Th e origins and structure of Islamic fi nance are fi rmly rooted in the scriptures of Islam, 54 one of the three great monotheistic religions. 55 As such, this section focuses on providing a glimpse into the religion of Islam and its law, in an eff ort to lay the foundation for understanding how and why the religion of Islam precipitated the growth of an alternative fi nancial industry. Albeit that a detailed analysis of Islam is outside the scope of this work, a brief look is nonetheless warranted so as to understand the genesis of this unique system of fi nance that has now come to be commonly referred to as "Islamic Finance". Th e discussion will start by focusing on the religion, and will then turn to providing insight as the areas of Islamic law that specifi cally impact Islamic fi nance. 53 Th e discussion of aspects of Islamic law presented here are by necessity brief, and are thus neither intended to be without exception or qualifi cation, but are simply intended to provide the framework for elaboration of the mandatory provisions that impact Islamic fi nancial transactions. 54 Supra, note 1, 1. 55 With Christianity and Judaism being the other two.
Th e advent of Islam 56 gave the peoples of seventh-century Arabia a new identity-an identity based on faith, rather than one based on tribal affi liation. In so doing, Islam essentially served to awaken a conscience of a people, and transformed a person's primary loyalty from the tribe to God. 57 It is the duty of all Muslims to submit to God's Will, as articulated in Shariʿah. 58 Th e Shariʿah, which is formed by the combination of the Qurʾān 59 and the Prophetic Sunnah, 60 is the divinely ordained pattern of human conduct; 61 governing all aspects of a people's relationship with their maker, as well as their relationship between themselves and others, and categorising all human acts within one of the following fi ve categories: (1) wāgib (obligation); (2) mandūb (recommended); (3) mubah (permitted); (4) makrūh (disapproved/disliked); and (5) ḥ aram (forbidden/prohibited).
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Although the Qurʾān is explicit in a number of places regarding obligations and prohibitions, in general it is more expressive in terms of the purpose, rationale and benefi t of its laws. 63 Qurʾānic legislation diff ers from 56 Islam came as a revelation to Prophet Muhammad in the year 610 AD. Th e preIslamic period is often referred to as the "jahiliyyah", which many defi ne as the period of ignorance, but Karen Armstrong argues that recent study shows that the Prophet used the term "jahiliyyah" to refer to a state of mind that caused violence and terror in 7th century 58 "Th e path" is the literal translation of the Arabic term "Shariʿah". 59 Th e Qurʾān, the sacred scriptures of the Muslims, is viewed by Muslims as the words of God and, as is pointed out by Armstrong, the language of the Qurʾān, as is the case with the Jewish scriptures, represents the sacred words in someway spoken by God himself. She further points out that the Qurʾān, which literally means "recitation" (as Muhammad could neither read nor write), is written in a language so exquisite, and of such beauty, which so moves and stirs people and serves to further fuel their belief that the words could only come from God. See, supra, note 56, 57.
60 Th e Prophetic Sunnah is the collection of Hadith and examples of the Prophet. According to Shafi 'i in his Risala, the Prophetic Sunnah serves to prescribe what God has revealed in the Qurʾān, and it explains the general principles of the Qurʾān and clarifi es the will of God; and it is also where the Prophet has ruled on matters on which the Qurʾān is silent. 61 Fazlur Rahman, Islam, Chicago (Chicago University Press) 1979, p. 68. 62 Supra, note 1, 41. 63 Th e Shariʿah is generally predicated on benefi ts to the individual and the community, and its laws are designed so as to protect these benefi ts and to facilitate the improvement and perfection of the conditions of human life on earth and Rahmah (mercy or compassion) is considered by the ʿUlama (scholars) to be its all-pervasive objective. ʿAdl (justice) is legal codes in form, 64 because as a rule the Shariʿah does not "state" the law in a strictly legal sense, but rather articulates a system of "oughts" and "oughtnots" 65 from which the "law" must be extracted or derived.
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It is from this foundation that one begins to understand that the Shariʿah itself is not law, but undoubtedly, the Qurʾān along with the Prophetic Sunnah, constitute the sources from which Islamic law can be derived, with primacy of place given to the Qurʾān, which is then followed by the Sunnah. 67 Th e process of extracting or deriving legal rules from its sources requires human eff ort and is termed "ijtihād ". 68 Hence, in Islamic Jurisprudence ( fi qh), the distinction between law and its sources is carefully maintained.
69 Th e law is a product of ijtihād-standing at the end of the interpretative process. 70 Although ijtihād will result in the jurist "opinion" 71 as to what the law is, ijtihād is by no means a subjective 72 process; it is rather an objective process that employs a particular 68 In legal usage, ijtihād refers to the endeavor of jurist to formulate a rule of law on the basis of evidence (daliʾi ) found in the sources. See generally supra, note 66, 200. 69 Ibid., 199-203. 70 Notwithstanding, it is important to note that the jurists do not create law, rather the jurist's task is that of elucidating and formulating legal rules from that which is present in the sources, but not always self-evident. 71 'Islamic law has been called a "jurists' law". Th is description is apt if it is used to express the idea that only the jurists are in a position to discover the Law of God and, having discovered it, to state authoritatively what the Law is. To the extent that the Law of God may be found at all in the mundane realm, it is only found in the formulations of jurists. It is primarily by virtue of the ijtihād of jurists that Islamic law exists at all as a body of positive rules'. See supra, note 66, 201. 72 Ibid., insofar as subjective factors enter into juristic deliberations, the results are to be methodology. 73 Th e methods and principles that govern ijtihād are collectively known as ʾusūl-al-fi qh.
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Th e subject of ʾusūl-al-fi qh was expounded upon by Mohamed Ibn Idris Al-Shafi ʾi in the Risala.
75 Th e following passages elucidate the salient points in Al-Shafi ʾi's Risala as it relates to ʾusūl-al-fi qh. As noted by Hallaq, 76 AlShafi ʾi begins by defi ning the sources and the methods by which God communicates his message within the Shariʿah:
Muslims are duty-bound to attempt to gain and augment ʿilm, that is knowledge of the scripture in its direct as well as oblique meanings. For God has revealed His precepts in a variety of forms. In one form, He unequivocally states in the Qurʾān certain rulings, such as those related to prayer, alms-tax, pilgrimage, fasting, etc. In another form, the rulings are stipulated in the Qurʾān in general terms, the details of which the Prophet has laid down in his Sunnah. God has also decreed certain rulings through his Prophet, without there being any reference to them in the Qurʾān. Finally, the revealed texts, the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, provide, in the absence of explicitly formulated rulings, indications and signs (dalalāt) which lead to the discovery of what God intended the law to be.' 77 Al-Shafi ʾi then goes on to explain that, in the cases where the Shariʿah explicitly states the legal rules, then the legal rules, without modifi cation, are the law. But, when the sources are not explicit, Al-Shafi ʾi states that a jurist must employ qiyās 78 in extracting what they believe to be Islamic law:
Obviously, when the Book or the Sunnah provides the legal solution to a particular problem, no inference is needed. But when there arises a new case for which the texts wholly redetected, for juristic thinking in such case constitutes innovation (bidʿah) not opinion. 73 Supra, note 1, 32. 74 For a good introduction to ʾusūl-al-fi qh, see Kamali, supra, note 63, 1-13. 75 Al-Risala is widely acknowledged as the fi rst work of authority on ʾusūl-al-fi qh. For an instruction to Islamic jurisprudence see, e.g., Kamali, Mohammad Hashim. Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. Kuala Lumpur (Ilmaiah Publ.) 1999.
Ibid., and Hallaq, supra, note 67, 1-34. 76 Supra, note 67. 77 Al-Shafi , as cited by Hallaq, supra, note 67, 22-23. 78 Qiyās is defi ned 'analogical reasoning, concluded from a given principle or is similar to this precedent on the strength of a common essential feature called the reason (ʿilla)', see Rahman, supra, note 61. Where ʿilla is "the underlying principle or objective of a Shari'ah injunction" see Nabil Saleh, 'Law Governing Contracts Law in Arabia', ICLQ, 38/4 (1989) 762.
provide no express solution, the exercise of ijtihād becomes not only necessary but obligatory. In the absence of a formulated textual solution, the jurist must look for a parallel textual case for which a solution is provided. If the new case has the same ratio legis (maʿnā; lit. meaning) as that given to the parallel textual case, the ruling in the text must be transferred to the new case. But such a ratio legis is not always capable of identifi cation, in which event the jurist must locate all cases in the texts that resemble the new case, and must transfer the ruling of the most similar case to the new case at hand. Th ese two methods, one based on a ratio legis, the other on a similitude, are together with the a fortiori argument, the exclusive constituents of ijtihād (=qiyās). Any inference that is governed by less than the strict implications and signifi cations of the texts is invalid and hence impermissible. 79 Th us, making it clear that in the case of 'ilm, where the sources are explicit, the sources are the law and are mandatory. But, in the cases where the sources are not explicit and leave room for ijtihād, then Islamic jurisprudence allows for "disagreement" or diff erence (ikhtilāf ) 80 of opinion between qualifi ed jurists. 81 In the case where ijtihād results in consensus (ijmaʿ) on a given point amongst qualifi ed jurists of an age, 82 the ruling has a binding and absolute authority. While it is the doctrine of ijma' that provides an authoritative umbrella for Islamic law, it is the doctrine of ikhtilāf that gives authoritative foundation to the variant schools of theory (maḏ āhib) in Islamic law. 83 It is important to note that there are two main sects in the religion of Islam, Sunni and Shi'a. While ikhtilāf in legal 79 Al-Shafi , as cited by Hallaq, supra, note 67, 22-23. 80 Ikhtilāf is often explained and justifi ed by the following alleged dictum of the Prophet Muhammad: 'Diff erence of opinion within my community is a sign of the bounty of Allah'. In addition, this is also one of the reasons that Muslim jurisprudence insists very strongly that the results of ijtihād be classifi ed as zann, or opinion, and that zann be carefully distinguished from 'ilm, or knowledge because the notion of opinion suggests possibility of error an inevi- 81 In the Risala, Al-Shafi ʾi identifi es the following as requirements of a jurists to be considered "qualifi ed" to perform ijtihād: Knowledge of Arabic, Knowledge of the legal contents of the Book, and its general and particular language, knowledge of the theory of abrogation (naskh), must be able to employ the Sunnah in interpreting those Qurʾanic verses that are equivocal, and in the absence of a Sunnah he must be aware of the existence of a consensus which might inform the case at hand. Further he must have attained majority, be of sound mind, and willing and ready to exert his utmost intellectual eff ort in solving the case. 82 Supra, note 1. 83 Supra, note 80, 23-24.
doctrine is crystallised in Sunni Islam by the existence of four maḏ āhib, Shiʾa Islam does not accept this premise. 84 Th e four schools of Sunni Islam 84 It is import to note that while in Islam there are two main sects, the Sunni and the Shiʾa, this paper is only addressing Sunni Islam. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to address Shiʾa Islam in detail, it is thought to be helpful to point to the three diff erences between the Sunni and Shiʾa Twelver or Imami tradition as identifi ed by Bernard Weiss:
One diff erence between the two communities is their conception of which sources may be used in deriving rules. Both the Sunnis and the Shiʾis accept the Koran and the Tradition of the Prophet as sources of law, although each community has its own collection of prophetic material as well as its own notion of true revelation. Both communities believe in an infallible source of truth after the age of the Prophet, but they diff er as to its identity. For the Sunnis, this further source of truth is the Consensus of the Community, which, although it consist largely of the consensus of earlier generations of Muslims (particularly that of the Companions of the Prophet), is supposed to contain the contemporary consensus on a continuing basis. For the Twelever Shiʾis, the twelve infallible Imams (spiritual guides) of the Community, as descendents of the Prophet's cousin and daughter, are accepted as a continuing source of truth. Consensus must include the infallible Imam, and because the Imam's pronouncements are correct whether included in a consensus or not, the importance of consensus in the Shiʾi theory of sources of truth is minimal.
A second diff erence between the two communities is their attitude toward human intuition (ʿaql) as an independent source of law. Sunni Islam does not recognize human intuition as valid source of law. Consequently, it maintains an absolute dependence upon the sacred texts. Among Sunni jurists, God alone is the ultimate determiner of all rules of human conduct (and because the ethical and the legal are not separated in Islam, of all moral values). Th e obverse of this is that the human intellect, without revelation, is incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. Th is incapacity exists because right and wrong exist solely by virtue of divine command, and because divine command is considered to be beyond the reach of the unaided human intellect. In Shiʾi Islam, on the other hand, divine command and human intellect are complementary; right and wrong are the common postulates of both revelation and reason.
Th e recognition in Shiʾi jurisprudence of the competence of human intellect points to a third important diff erence. Generally speaking, Shiʾism places a higher premium on knowledge than does Sunni Islam. Consequently, Shiʾism displays a more cautious attitude toward opinion. Because intuition is recognized as a valid source of ethicallegal values, legal knowledge is considered to be more within the reach of man in Shiʾi tradition than it is in Sunni tradition. Shiʾism affi rms a functional bond between sacred text and rational intuition which helps to safeguard man from uncertainty. Furthermore, by positing the infallible doctrine of the Imam, Shiʾism increases the wellsprings of truth. In contrast to the consensus-which, by its very nature, is indefi nite-the word of the Imam is concrete and historically verifi able, like the Sunna of the Prophet. In fact, the word of the Imam is incorporated into a more comprehensive Sunna, that of the Prophet cum Imam, unlike the Sunni Consensus which has always remained are the Maliki, Hanafi , Hanbali, and Shafi ʾi. Although each individual Muslim is free to follow the school of their choice, Islamic nation states have each traditionally followed a particular maḏ hab (school). For example, Hanafi law has traditionally been applied in that area of the Middle East now covered by Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, the Sudan, and in the Indian subcontinent, while Maliki law has governed the Muslim populations in North, West, and Central Africa and Shafi ʾi law has prevailed in East Africa, the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula and in Southeast Asia. Hanbali law is today the law of the land in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 85 With the exception of Hanbali law, which is codifi ed as the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Hanafi law, which was codifi ed as part of the Tanzimat 86 undertaken by the Ottoman Empire, the majority of Islamic fi qh is documented in the works of the jurists, and is written in classical Arabic. 87 distinct from the Sunna. Th us, not only does Shiʾism recognize more sources of divinely given truth than does Sunni Islam, but it also acknowledges a greater capacity of the human intellect to derive legal knowledge.
Nonetheless, Shiʾi tradition does not altogether disregard opinion as a basis of law. Although it may be able to distinguish between right and wrong, the human intellect is not considered to be entirely capable of perceiving the specifi c requirements of divine law, particularly in the realm of worship. Consequently, the sacred texts (including the sayings of the Imams) remain an indispensable source of law. And no text, however sacred, is so unambiguous that it does not require some interpretation. Consequently, opinion is a necessary part of the law in Shiʾism.
But opinion is carefully circumscribed in Shiʾi jurisprudence. Ikhtilāf-plurality of legal schools (maḏ āhib)-is disallowed. Th e ideal of a single, uniform body of truth is piously upheld. Th e principle restriction upon the exercise of opinion is a rejection of qiyās, or analogical reasoning, which is a basic tool of interpretation in Sunni Islam. Shiʾi jurisprudence does not allow opinion to exceed the confi nes of the actual meaning of a text. It regards reasoning by analogy as too conjectural, too subjective. Th e Shiʾi theorist maintains that one can never give adequate objective grounds for affi rming a thing to be the true ratio (ʿilla) of a given rule, unless the ratio is clearly stated in the text (mansūs alayhā), in which case there is no real analogical reasoning from the text, but rather a simple declaration of what is found in the text.'
See supra, note 66, 211-212. 85 Islamic jurisprudence, related to the governing of human interaction is divided into three areas: (1) Domestic relations; (2) Punishment; and (3) Civil obligations.
88 Th e section that governs civil obligations is known as fi qh al-muʿamalāt. Th us, further discussion of fi qh, will be limited to that of fi qh al-muʿamalāt and only as it relates to the subject of commercial transactions.
Fiqh al-Muʿamalāt as a Governing Law of Contract in Islamic Finance
While it is beyond the scope, or purpose, of this section to deal with aspects of fi qh al-muʿamalāt in an exhaustive manner, it is important to gain insight as to certain pivotal aspects of this topic in relation to being governing law of contract in commercial transactions. Further, sources of prohibitions pertaining to Shariʿah compliant commercial transactions, their treatment, and their impact on Islamic fi nancial transactions will also be discussed.
In Islam, commerce and trade are not only condoned, they are encouraged: Trade was encouraged (Q4:29), and parties were free to trade in all that was created by God (Q45:13), with the only limitations being those of trade in that which was specifi cally prohibited by God: 90 For example, in addition to riba and gharar, it would also be prohibited to trade in alcohol and pork, which are also specifi cally prohibited. and the parties were to be governed by the principles of good faith.
91 Th e following verses from the Qurʾān elucidate these principles: ʿAqd al-bayʿ (contract of sale), as may be expected in a commercial legal system that was designed to support trade, 93 serves as the model from which Muslim jurists extrapolated all other contract types. 94 It also served as the source of specifi c rules governing each type of transaction. 95 Given that, as indicated earlier, a general maxim of contract in Islamic law is 'all is permitted unless specifi cally prohibited', further discussion of the general prohibitions is warranted, as these rules and principles will permeate the fabric of all contracts constructed in accordance with the principles of Islamic law.
Compliance with the pivotal aspects of Shariʿah in Islamic fi nance is at times understood by some to simply be the accommodation of a few specifi c legal restrictions, namely, prohibiting the use of transactions that include riba or gharar. While the prohibitions are real, they are neither 91 Nudrat Majeed, 'Good Faith and Due Process: Lessons Learned from the Shariʿa', Arbitration International, Vol. 20/1 (2004), 97-112. 92 As noted, obligations include both spiritual and material, with the material including commercial contracts. 93 For succinct presentation of the centrality of trade in Islam see Mallat, supra, note 9. 94 Ibid., Mallat terms the contract of sale the 'paragon' of all contracts in Islamic law. 95 For general overview of Islamic contract law, see generally supra, note 1, Ch. 5.
exhaustive, nor is their application simple. While the principle of freedom of contract is recognised by Islamic law, it is restricted by certain prohibitions. Th ese prohibitions include not only riba and gharar, but also other prohibitions that are often not mentioned, that must be considered, as the lack of compliance with such prohibitions may render a contract void. One such prohibition, found in the Hanafi and Shafi ʾi schools, is that which prohibits the inclusion of multiple transactions within one contract. 96 Moreover, the depth of detail by which Islamic jurisprudence treats these prohibitions infuses a complexity that, although not insurmountable, renders simply extracting a few basic rules to follow, as to ensure Shariʿah compliance, at best insuffi cient. 97 As such, the sources and treatment of the prohibitions related to riba and gharar are presented in turn, and then followed by a discussion of those aspects that may also serve to further restrict the parties' freedom to contract.
Riba
Th ere is ijmaʿ amongst Islamic jurists on the prohibition of riba, which has been explicitly prohibited in the Qurʾān in several places, with the earliest chronological prohibition being that found in Surā 30:39. 98 Despite ijmaʿ regarding prohibition of riba, ikhtilāf regarding the defi nition of riba 99 is found amongst the maḏ āhib.
Riba, which etymologically means "excess" or "increase," is not defi ned in the Qurʾān, 100 and is expressed in more than one sense in the Shariʿah; namely riba al-jahiliyyah, riba al-nasiʾah, and riba al-fadl. 101 Riba al-jahiliyyah, which is used to denote the type of riba in use during the Jahiliyyah period, the period before the advent of Islam, was specifi cally prohibited in the Qurʾān.
As noted by El-Sanhouri, this Hadith has helped to defi ne usages of the term riba as it relates to the prohibitions in the Qurʾān by establishing that which is ribawī (riba-related), 108 and the type of exchange of such goods that would constitute riba. 109 Namely, the exchange of goods of a single type without equality constitutes riba al-fadl, and exchange among the ribawī goods, with delay, constitutes riba al-nasiʾah. 110 Th e preceding discussion serves to shed some light on the prohibition on riba, and to give insight as to why ikhtilāf amongst the Islamic jurists may exist, and that notwithstanding, the scope of the ikhtilāf may vary, certain nuances must be noted when attempting to structure fi nancial transactions that are Shariʿah compliant. Although the prohibition of gharar was only expounded upon in relation to trade in the Sunnah, two forms of activity depending on chance were specifi cally named in the above verses; namely gambling, representing the extreme form of that which depends on chance, and (divination by) arrows. Do not buy fi sh in the sea, for it is gharar. Whoever buys foodstuff s, let him not sell them until he has possession of them.
He who purchases food shall not sell it until he weighs it [yaktalahu] .
Th e Prophet forbade the sale of grapes until they became black, and the sale of grain until it is strong.
Th e above Hadiths provide examples of transactions where either chance or uncertainty govern the defi nition and/or delivery of the material aspects of the transaction. Th ey also indicate that when this level of chance, or uncertainty, becomes more similar to gambling, than to acceptable level of business risk, the transaction is prohibited. Although there is ijmaʿ regarding this principle, there is ikhtilāf regarding the point on the spectrum between full information and certainty, and ignorance and speculation, at which the transaction traverses from a valid transaction of trade, to the prohibited exchange of gharar. 
Freedom of Contract-To What Extent?
Th is section will provide a discussion pertaining to the mandates found in the Sunnah that may serve to further constrain parties' freedom of contract. 116 Namely, traders are prevented from dealing in items that are prohibited; contracting in a manner that leads to that which is prohibited; or contracting based on actions that are specifi cally forbidden. Outside of the parameter of these prohibitions exists the frame of the parties' freedom of contract.
It is in the concerns of the use of stipulations, or conditions, in contracts that there exists clear ikhtilāf amongst the maḏ āhib. Th is divergence stems from the interpretations of the Hadiths. Namely, the following Hadiths 114 Supra, note 1. 115 For more detailed discussion regarding the points on the spectrum which various schools defi ne as the transition point, see supra, note 1, 88-93. 116 Supra, note 1, 67-68.
serve to restrict the parties' use of stipulations 117 and their use of one contract to accomplish multiple transactions: Primarily the four schools are to be found on the opposite ends of the spectrum regarding the permissibility of stipulations. 118 Hanafi and Shafi ʾi are the most restrictive in their interpretation, permitting only stipulations that serve to facilitate the object of the contract or those found in customary law (ʿurf ) and rendering all others void. Whereas the Maliki and Hanbali schools have the widest, most permissive interpretation, with Ibn Taymia of the Hanbali school being the most permissive.
Th e Hanafi and Shafi ʾi schools 119 are committed to the legal doctrine of singularity of the transaction in the contract, and allow only stipulations that are required to make the contract operative or those that are suitable to the purpose of contract or those that were customary in societal transactions. If a stipulation is not directly required by the contract, or is not customarily practised, and constitutes a benefi t to one of the parties of the contract and not the other, it is considered a void stipulation and also results in the voiding of the contract. Also, the stipulations which benefi t only one of the parties, such as if the seller of a house requires that he lives in it for a month, or the buyer of a piece of cloth requires the seller to make it into a dress, are void and result in the voiding of the sale. Th e reason is that the stipulations are seen to result in extra benefi ts, without a commensurate increase in the rate of the contract, and as such are considered riba, and the sale that includes riba is forbidden.
Th e other group, the Maliki and Hanbali schools, 120 reject the doctrine of singularity of contract in most cases, and start from the principle of the validity of the stipulations. Th ey consider the voidable stipulations are the exceptions. Th e only exceptions where singularity of the contract is required are the three cases specifi cally mentioned in the Hadiths identifi ed above.
Ibn Taymia, 121 a Hanbali scholar, further relaxed the process of the validation of the stipulations by stating that contracts and stipulations are originally valid except in two cases: (1) Where there is a specifi c prohibition in the Shariʿah; or (2) If the stipulation contradicts the intent, or purpose, of the contract.
Th e consequences of entering into contracts that include riba, gharar, or that extend beyond the proscribed limitations on the parties' freedom of contract, are considered void in Islamic law, and hence will not be enforced.
Th e Shariʿah and Public Policy
Islamic law, like every system of law, has a set of mandatory rules; these rules and their relation to public policy are the subject of this section.
Mandatory rules, which are meant to protect the interest of the community, cannot be contravened by private contract. Shariʿah requires conformity with these rules in no uncertain terms; private contracts involving acts that are contrary to the mandatory principles of Shariʿah are considered null and void. But, does violation of these mandatory rules result in a violation of what may be seen as 'public policy' within the eyes of Islam?
Answering this question requires a defi nition of public policy from within the context of Islamic law. A defi nition was provided by the Supreme Islamic court of Egypt that, together with other Islamic courts, was disbanded in the mid-1950s as follows:
Public policy [in Islamic law] does not permit that respect owed to religion be diminished by the violation of its rules and prescriptions formulated by a conclusive source which is acknowledged and admitted by the unanimity of spiritual leaders. [Decision of 23 September 1946] 122 Sunni Muslim scholars have drawn the conclusion that any rule that originates from a religious source (Qurʾān, Sunnah, or ijmaʿ) has conclusive and specifi c characteristics pertaining to public policy. 123 From this, it may 121 Ibid., 187-191. 122 Nabil Saleh, "Th e Law Governing Contracts in Arabia", ICLQ, 38/4 (1989) 779. 123 Ibid.
be concluded that a violation of the mandatory provisions of Shari'ah may be considered a violation of Islamic public policy. 
